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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The issues on appeal have been properly preserved. 
POINT II. Appellants have stated with precision the relief they seek on 
appeal. The lower court incorrecdy dismissed the remaining 
counterclaims although Appellants presented unrebutted evidence 
to support the elements of the remaining causes of action. 
POINT III. The trial court did not properly apply the law to the facts. 
The unrebutted evidence shows that Appellees intentionally 
interfered with Appellants5 economic relations and wrongfully filed 
suit after Appellees had cancelled the contract. Suit was filed for 
the sole purpose of holding Appellants' property hostage, and tying 
up Appellants' money in the Property, if Appellants would not 
agree to sell the Property under the terms of the contract 
previously cancelled by Appellees. 
POINT IV. Appellants have properly marshalled the evidence. 
POINT V. The trial court's conclusions are not justified in light of the 
facts presented. The evidence marshalled by Appellants shows that 
the trial court failed to properly apply the applicable law in Utah. 
Appellants have presented unrebutted facts to support prima facie 
cases for intentional interference with economic relations and 
wrongful initiation of proceedings. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE ISSUES ON APPEAL HAVE BEEN PROPERLY 
PRESERVED 
The case cited by appellees, Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Keller Corp. 392 
P.2d 620, 15 Utah 2d 318 (Utah 1964), dealt with the claim that the trial court 
erred in refusing to allow separate trials. The court was dealing with a 
procedural matter. In the same paragraph cited by Appellees, at page 621, the 
court states the following immediately before the statement cited by Appellees: 
...(T)he record does not disclose any request for separate 
trials by any of the appellants nor does it disclose any objection 
to the court's decision to try the matter in one trial even though 
different parcels and different interests would be affected. In view 
of the fact that the record discloses no request for separate trial nor 
any objection made to trying all the interests in one trial, this court 
will not review an alleged error which the trial court was given no 
opportunity to correct. 
In Pettingill v. Perkins. 272 P.2d 185, 2 Utah 2d 266, (Utah 1954), which 
was cited in the Porcupine case, the appellant had failed to object to a jury 
instruction. On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that it would "not review a 
ground of objection not urged in the trial court." 
The appeal before this court is not for any objection to procedure in the 
lower court. This appeal has been filed because the trial court failed to find that 
Appellants have presented prima facie cases of (1) interference with economic 
interests and (2) wrongful filing of litigation. Appellees have not cited any rule 
that requires a non-prevailing party to object to the lower court's ruling on the 
merits before an appeal can be filed. In fact, as stated in Appellants' brief, the 
2 
Appellate court can "review the trial couil w legjlll i i inclusions tnicki n mnvclion 
of-error standard according those concliisioris no particular deference/ Bellon 
v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092, (Utah 1WI K 
POINT .APPELLANTS HAVE STATED WITH PRECISION THE 
RELIEF THEY SEEK ON APPEAL 
In Appellees Sumiuai "," n Appellees claim dku Appellants 
have not stated with precision the relief vwwcit Appellants seek or appeal 
However, both issues presenled r 
appeal clearly question whether the *r-M n^in committed reversible erro > 
dismissing Appellants' causes of action I Sec Statement of Issues on Appeal 
r . i s I an opellants ask this eouu io reverse the ruling 
of the trial court. 
1 • : II" II II III, I ^ M _ >KiA*. v-w v . . . «_^ _ ; _ PROPERLY APPLY _ , 
LAW TO THE FACTS 
Tne facts presented h] ' appellants suppoil In till mil lln i nrivs ml lUinu 
tried, i.e., intentional interference with prospective relations as set torth in Leigh 
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. b: - •*. . . . J vroagkd 
i iif nriirppdiinijis as set forth in. Crease y , Pleasant Grove Citv 519 P.2d 
888 (Utah 1 v :±> and Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976). The elements 
u-- t-iu» » "(I liHiiili in ikh|>pt Hants Bill"! '.lailinp on payrs 7 and 16, 
respectively. Rulings in both cases were based on the motive, intent, or purpose 
..v., tlic lawsuils had been tilled. 
3 
In Leigh, the court found "improper means" when Isom was required: 
...to defend what appear to have been two groundless 
lawsuits.... Such use of civil litigation as a weapon to damage 
another's business, besides being an intolerable waste of judicial 
resources, may give rise to independent causes of action in tort for 
abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Id at 309 (also cited 
in Appellants' Brief at pages 10 and 11) 
Although Appellees claim they acted in "good faithH when they recorded the lis 
pendens and filed suit, there is undisputed evidence that Appellees had previously 
cancelled and backed out of the Contract to purchase the Property. (R. 441, lines 7-18; 
R. 450, lines 14-25; R. 443, lines 17 through R. 444, line 1. Also see Appellants' Brief, 
Statement of Facts, pages 4-5 paragraphs 2-4.) Since Appellees had previously cancelled 
the Contract, Appellees no longer had any contract rights to enforce. As such, the filing 
of the suit itself was in fact improper since the only purpose of the suit was to attempt 
to force Appellants to recognize the cancelled contract and force Appellants to sell the 
Property to Appellees. By filing the lawsuit, Appellees intended to cause a hardship on 
Appellants by preventing Appellants from selling the property to any third party, which 
would tie up Appellants' money in the Property and cost Appellants legal fees and loss 
of use of Appellants' money unless Appellants would sell to Appellees. 
The Record was cited in Appellants' Brief, on pages 8, 9, 11 and 12, setting forth 
the uncontroverted statements made to Mr. Huish by Mrs. Davis that show that the filing 
of the suit by the Davises was for the purpose of preventing Appellants from selling the 
Property to anybody else, which clearly interfered with Appellants' economic relations. 
Furthermore, Finding of Fact No. 9 admits that "the recording of the lis pendens 
interfered with the prospective economic relations of [Appellants]/ 
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Had the Davises noi already etiJteiJ,IIUJI "l ,l «,ii»ii,i,t ««<»*«»»« and Icrmmalnl lln 11 
right to purchase the Property, by words ^nti h* their a c t i o s (see Appellants ' Brief 
pages 4-5 , paragraphs 2-4. and the Record citeu „-.. ^ i a paragraphs) pen haps the lliliiig 
wouiu have been justified. However, Mr . Davis h;i*> manifested me 
Davises ' intent to terminate the contract by his statements to Mr . Huis, (k +•«,, nes 
7 * " l>IH IMK.S M 'Si Tlu1 IV. Ihoivnl'frr returned the key to the house to 
Mr . Huish (R. 443 , lines (7 K 4 ~ * and the Davises never objected to the listing 
o* .,.,, ; ,wjK-rty M >: \nv caju •* ^ 
Brief paragraphs 2»4ej . l i ius , the Davises ' actions confirmed their intent to cancel, As 
such, the lawsuit was not really filed to enforce a vaiia contrai _ » 
contract *-•- v-'t to resolve. • 
The Davises claim there was probable cause for the suit when Appellants retained 
tl ' L11C U J l l U d W l . 
Ironically, the Davises dio not sue u? ?vco\ >,000.00. There was no demand for 
repayment in the compia);/ 
w a s o n j y filed for "the specific purpose oi ^ : u r e n n r with the *K *r>env nebis of 
Appellants. The Davises held the Property hostage hopmg Appellants would need to get 
tin ii" m o o n '"i:: ul of the Property hoping- this would force Appellants to decide whether 
to face the legal and economic costs nr agree to seH tr i*e Davises i improper 
pin pose i1' \ Ii/ii i" mi",11«, mi i« in Appellants' claims intentional interference with 
economic interests and the wrongful initiation of proceedings. 
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POINT IV: APPELLANTS HAVE PROPERLY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE 
The fourth point asserted by Appellees in their Brief is that "Utah law prohibits 
the Appellants' from arguing the facts without marshalling the evidence/ 
The only evidence provided at the trial was the testimony of Mr. Huish. 
Appellants have clearly marshalled the evidence as set forth in the testimony cited in the 
Statement of Facts on pages 4 through 7 and on pages 8 through 14 of Appellants' Brief. 
Specific testimony is quoted on pages 8, 9, 11-14, 16, 18, and 20. On pages 16 and 20 
the record is cited for testimony presented which supports the elements of wrongful 
initiation of proceedings. 
As such, the evidence has clearly been marshalled by Appellants to support 
Appellants' position that prima facie cases have been presented. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT JUSTIFIED IN 
LIGHT OF THE FACTS PRESENTED 
The evidence presented by Appellants shows that prima facie cases for intentional 
interference with economic relations and wrongful initiation of the lawsuit have been 
established. The Davises' motive to hold the Property hostage and cause injury to 
Appellants, if Appellants would not capitulate to the Davises' unjustified demands is 
evident. 
By reviewing the only facts before the trial court, Appellants have shown that 
there was no contract to be enforced by the trial court. Appellees had backed out of it 
and cancelled it - verbally, and by their actions and inaction (R. 441, lines 7-18; R.450, 
lines 14-25; R. 443, lines 17 through R. 444, line 1; R. 444 lines 2-5; also see 
6 
Appellants'Brief pages : ^ paragraph-. . j^pptnct i 
in their brief that would indicate otherwise. Nor have Appellees claimed tha^ 
Statement of Facts presented by Appellants is not true, Appellees ,.:•_: ::; 
l i r i i ,„,!,„!!! nmt's findings and conclusions. Since 'opellees did not present *ny evidence at 
trial, Appellants contend that the trial court ignored the evidence presented > . ^M..*.. as 
It: i !Ii il  ; -. " • '• ' ' : ; ' ' • '" " • 
The lower court's ruling has effectively condoned die "hostage-taking" ~c 
Appellants property, and a demand for ransom, i • 5 i v 
cancelled or face all of the expenses and loss of the use of Appellants' money and 
property while the property is tied up in court ' ider the facts presented in this case, 
thr f11iiI "' lur; nmdoiied lln," use of courts to attempt to revive contracts clearly 
cancelled by one party. Such action allows the cancelling party to hold the property 
hostage until i JIIMI1 Inniserable damages In llliin noiH\mceIliiif> lunlv forcing (hi nil in 
cancelling party to choose between suffering damages while defending its position or 
capitulate to the demands of the party that cancelled, 
As set forth above and in Appellants' Brief, the facts ui ihis ease Nearly show the 
trial court erred in failing to properly find that Appellants have established a prima facie 
case of intentiona 1 inter < Mice with Appellants' economic relations as recognized by "this 
court in Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom. 65^ P ?d 293 (Utah 1982^ and as 
recognized in GS Eritcip. »>^  \. i a»;i...,.» ^ v y W (Mz : ). 
- The trial court also ignored that law in Crease v. Pleasant Grove City. 519 P.2d 
The wrongful initiation of proceedings has been established in the Record wherein the 
Davises have asked the lower court to compel Appellants to sell the Property to the 
Davises which Appellants "would not otherwise be legally obligated to do / Such use 
of the court is an abuse of process by the Davises which should not be allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues were properly argued and supported by facts presented at the trial. 
However, the lower court ignored the law in its application of the law to the facts. 
Inasmuch as Appellees had terminated their rights in the contract by words and actions, 
the filing of the suit itself thereafter was wrongful. It was filed for the express purpose 
of holding the property hostage with the intent to injure Appellants unless Appellants 
agreed to sell the property to the Appellees under the terms of the contract the Appellees 
had previously, unequivocally terminated. 
Finally, Appellants have clearly marshalled the evidence to show cancellation of 
the Contract, and the Davises' intent to injure Appellants if Appellants would not agree 
to recognize the contract the Davises had previously cancelled. The facts support prima 
facie cases of intentional interference with economic relations and wrongful initiation of 
proceeds. As such, the dismissal by the lower court should be reversed and the matter 
remanded, directing the trial court to receive evidence as to damages suffered by 
Appellants and award damages based thereon. 
Dated this \ ^ day of November, 1995. 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
STEPHEN B. El flfiUFM 
Stephen B. Elggren 
Attorney for Appellants 
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